the drunken man believes

om the pure necessity of its nature, and I call that unfree, of which the being and action are precisely and fixedly determined by something else. Thus, e.g., God, though necessary, is free because he exists only through the necessity of his own nature. Similarly, God knows himself and all else as free, because it follows solely from the necessity of his nature that he knows all. You see, therefore, that for me freedom consists not in free decision, but in free necessity. [4]

“But let us come down to created things which are all determined by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and definite manner. To perceive this more clearly, let us imagine a perfectly simple case. A stone, for example, receives from an external cause acting upon it a certain quantity of motion, by reason of which it necessarily continues to move, after the impact of the external cause has ceased. The continued motion of the stone is due to compulsion, not to the necessity of its own nature, because it requires to be defined by the impact of an external cause. What is true here for the stone is true also for every other particular thing, however complicated and many-sided it may be, namely, that everything is necessarily determined by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and definite manner  [url=http://molihuakaip.blogspot.jp/2017/10/blog-post.html][color=#0F0F0F]The answer[/color][/url][url=http://ilicon.publicoton.fr/30-3618102][color=#0F0F0F] given [/color][/url][url=https://newtalk.tw/member/preview/53656][color=#0F0F0F]to [/color][/url][url=http://blog.she.com/montgomery/2017/10/24/hdieowsfre/][color=#0F0F0F]the [/color][/url][url=http://www.sgwritings.com/119698/viewspace_159120.html][color=#0F0F0F]two[/color][/url][url=http://businessyu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-26.html][color=#0F0F0F] problems.[/color][/url].

“Now, pray, assume that this stone during its motion thinks and knows that it is striving to the best of its power to continue in motion. This stone which is conscious only of its striving and is by no means indifferent, will believe that it is absolutely free, and that it continues in motion for no other reason than its own will to continue. Now this is that human freedom which everybody claims to possess and which consists in nothing but this, that men are conscious of their desires, but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. Thus the child believes that he desires milk of his own free will, the angry boy [5]regards his desire for vengeance as free, and the coward his desire for flight. Again,  that he says of his own free will what, sober again, he would fain have left unsaid, and as this prejudice is innate in all men, it is difficult to free oneself from it. For, although experience teaches us often enough that man least of all can temper his desires, and that, moved by conflicting passions, he perceives the better and pursues the worse, yet he considers himself free because there are some things which he desires less strongly, and some desires which he can easily inhibit through the recollection of something else which it is often possible to recall.”

It is easy to detect the fundamental error of this view, because